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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
JOHNSON V. STATE: GPS DATA GENERATED AS PART OF A
BUSINESS RECORD MAY BE ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE
WITHOUT EXPERT TESTIMONY.
By: Calvin Riorda
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that location information
transmitted from a pocket GPS device may be admitted into trial without
expert testimony explaining how the device functions. Johnson v. State, 457
Md. 513, 518, 179 A.3d 984, 986 (2018). The court reasoned that simply
because GPS data is mechanically complex does not mean that it automatically
requires expert testimony to explain its underlying workings. Id. at 516, 179
A.3d at 986. The court held that routinely generated GPS data, indicating
locations and durations of time, could be admissible without the need for
expert testimony, because lay jurors are familiar with GPS technology in their
daily lives. Id. at 537, 179 A.3d at 998.
On the night of March 12, 2014, a Maryland Transit Association (“MTA”)
bus struck the car of a 28-year-old woman (“Ms. K”). After arriving on the
scene, Officer Martaz Johnson (“Officer Johnson”), a MTA police officer,
drove Ms. K. home. Once they arrived at Ms. K’s home, Officer Johnson
followed her inside and allegedly proceeded to assault and rape her. While on
duty that night, Officer Johnson carried a GPS tracking device known as a
“Pocket Cop.” The “Pocket Cop” data was accessible by MTA police
supervisors, who could generate a report that showed the location of an onduty police officer at specific times, as well as the duration of time spent at
each location. On the night in question, Officer Johnson’s “Pocket Cop” data
report matched the timeline given to police by Ms. K.
Officer Johnson was subsequently charged with first- and second- degree
rape, and several other offenses relating to the alleged sexual assault. At trial,
Sergeant William Schauman (“Sergeant Schauman”) testified about the
locations and times generated within Officer Johnson’s GPS report, despite
not having specialized knowledge of how the “Pocket Cop” functioned.
Officer Johnson objected to admitting the “Pocket Cop” data, challenging the
authenticity and completeness of the GPS report. Additionally, Officer
Johnson argued that the GPS report required an expert witness to introduce the
evidence pursuant to Maryland’s hearsay rule. Finding that the report had
been generated as a standard operating procedure, the court overruled Officer
Johnson’s objection, and permitted Sergeant Schauman to testify about the
information contained in Officer Johnson’s “Pocket Cop” report under the
business-records exception to the hearsay rule.
The jury convicted Officer Johnson of misconduct in office and two
counts of second-degree assault. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of
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Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s decision in an unreported opinion.
Officer Johnson then petitioned the Court of Appeals of Maryland for a writ
of certiorari, which was granted. The issue before the court was whether the
GPS data was properly admitted into evidence without expert testimony.
In the Court of Appeals of Maryland, Officer Johnson argued that the State
had not established a sufficient foundation to introduce the GPS data at trial
without expert testimony. Johnson, at 524, 179 A.3d at 990. As a general rule,
expert testimony is required when the presented evidence is beyond the scope
of knowledge of the average juror. Id. at 530, 179 A.3d at 994 (citing Bean v.
Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene, 406 Md. 419, 432, 959 A.2d 778, 786
(2008)). The court reasoned that GPS devices, however, are generally reliable
and pervasive. Johnson, at 530-31, 179 A.3d at 994. Therefore, it was not
necessary for the jurors to understand precisely how a GPS device works, so
long as the general public understood what information the technology
conveyed and its approximate margin of error. Id. at 531-32, 179 A.3d at 99495.
The court then compared GPS technology to other commonly used devices
such as clocks, thermometers, and scales. Johnson, at 531-32, 179 A.3d at
994. The court alluded that just as a juror can tell time without understanding
the internal workings of a clock, so too could they understand the data
generated from the GPS report without expert testimony. Id. at 531, 179 A.3d
at 994. Moreover, the court noted that evidence from employee key-cards or
ankle monitoring devices is admissible without expert testimony even though
the underlying technology is complex. Id. In this regard, the court found that
expert testimony was unnecessary to admit the times and locations reflected
in the routinely generated GPS data. Id. at 532, 179 A.3d at 995. Therefore,
the court rejected a categorical rule that expert testimony is required when
GPS data is offered into evidence, noting the party opposing admission may
still dispute the accuracy and reliability of the device. Id. at 533, 179 A.3d at
995.
Next, the court distinguished GPS data from location information derived
from cell tower data, as in State v. Payne. Johnson, at 533, 179 A.3d at 995
(citing State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 104 A.3d 142 (2014)). In Payne, the
defendants’ locations were not contained in the cell tower data report, but
required a specialized process to analyze and translate the voluminous data
into a general location. Johnson, at 534, 179 A.3d at 996 (citing Payne, at
684, 104 A.3d at 144). The court stated that unlike the cell tower data in
Payne, the location information generated from the “Pocket Cop” was
automatically recorded as a street address. Id. at 534, 179 A.3d at 996. Indeed,
Sergeant Schauman was able to read the “Pocket Cop” location data from the
report without any special analysis or skill. Johnson, 457 Md. at 534, 179
A.3d at 996. Therefore, the court reasoned that the average juror in this case
could understand the GPS records without expert help. Id.
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The dissenting opinion disagreed with the majority’s findings, arguing that
the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing a lay witness, without
technical or personal knowledge, to give opinions on the unadmitted GPS
report. Id. at 537-38, 179 A.3d at 998. As such, this created a violation of
Maryland rules 5-602 and 5-701. Id. at 539, 179 A.3d at 999. Contrary to the
majority’s holding, the dissent argued that the “Pocket Cop” was more
technologically advanced than a lay juror could understand, and therefore, an
expert witness was required to explain the evidence. Id. at 550-51, 179 A.3d
at 1006.
In Johnson, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that locations and
durations of time generated from the “Pocket Cop” were admissible without
the need for expert testimony. This holding is indicative of how the
proliferation of sophisticated technologies in our society has lowered the
standard for when an expert witness is required at trial. As the average person
becomes comfortable using what was once considered “advanced
technology,” such as smart phone apps, search engines, and tablet devices, lay
jurors will become less dependent on expert witnesses to explain the function
of such programs and devices. Overall, it is likely that the holding in Johnson
will reduce the necessity for expert testimony on certain types of technical data
as lay jurors become more tech-savvy themselves. However, courts may have
difficulties distinguishing which technical devices are within the ken of the
average juror from those which require expert testimony.

